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Abstract 
Decentralization in Indonesia has two distinguished characteristics in term of separation of functions and 
government funding. Indonesian decentralization law leaves central government with six functions: foreign 
affairs, defense, national security, judicial, fiscal and monetary, and religion, while local governments have to 
deliver other public goods to its local constituents. In terms of government funding, central government is 
obligated to transfer intragovernmental transfer fund to local government to support them to accomplish their 
functions in the form of balancing funds. This study offers new perspective on the relationship between 
decentralization and economic growth by exploring two different measures of regional gross domestic product 
(RGDP) use in Indonesia national account, such as RGDP to capture contributions of oil and gas revenue and 
RGDP without oil. The purpose is to level the playing field of all local government in provincial level without 
the influence of income from oil and gas sector. This paper employs two measurements of fiscal decentralization 
such as revenue decentralization and expenditure decentralization that captures both sides of local government 
budget. Other regional growth determinants such as demographic variables, infrastructures, government size, 
local economy structure, trading size in local economy, and level of investment also employed in this study. 
Using 33 provincial level data within the period 2000-2014 and GMM Arellano Bond estimation, this study 
finds out interesting result that fiscal decentralization works in opposite way toward regional growth when it 
measures with total output. On the revenue side, this create an incentive for poor region to remain poor and be 
eligible for intragovernmental transfer.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* Corresponding author.  
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On the expenditure side, intragovernmental transfer may create moral hazard on poor local government in the 
form of inefficient public spending. Opposite result is obtained when the study level the playing field for all 
local government. Both revenue and expenditure seem able to encourage growth.  On the revenue side, 
intragovernmental transfer able to address the growth activity which confirmed by the positive and significant 
result of expenditure decentralization measure. Several policy implications are suggested based on the result 
such as: introducing reward and punishment mechanism for local government budget, relaxing tax and 
retribution base of local government, and introducing compulsory investment/saving for resource rich region to 
handle the aforementioned issues. 
Key words: Regional Economic Growth; Decentralization; Revenue; Expenditure; Indonesia; Oil. 
1. Introduction  
Fiscal decentralization as an economic reform has proposed as a remedy for developing countries to pursue 
economic growth which adopted by a growing number of countries including Indonesia. The initiation of 
decentralization in Indonesia started after the Asian financial crisis of 1997 by introducing Law number 22/1999 
regarding Local Government and Law number 25/1999 regarding Fiscal Balance between Central & Local 
Government. Both laws came into effect on January 1st, 2001 which later were amended by Law Number 32 
and 33 of 2004 and Law Number 23 of 2014. These laws stipulate the autonomy of local government and 
distribution of function between central and local government. The quintessence in decentralization is the 
sharing of power and decision making over some economic issues to lower level of government such as 
performance of public delivery should be performed by agencies close to those being served [1]. 
Decentralization in Indonesia has two distinguished characteristics in term of separation of functions and 
government funding. The idea of shifting public service function to the local government comes from the idea of 
proximity of the local government to its local society. It assumes that the one who knows what is best for the 
society is no one except the society itself [2]. In terms of functions, the decentralization law leaves central 
government with six functions: foreign affairs, defense, national security, judicial, fiscal and monetary, and 
religion, while local governments have to deliver other functions to its local constituents.  
To support local government, central government is obliged to procure intragovernmental transfer to all local 
government regularly. In terms of government funding, intragovernmental transfer is the most significant 
revenue source for local government in Indonesia. The basic principles for intragovernmental transfer is “money 
follows functions” principle, which means that the funding is following the respected government function for 
each level of government.  The law stipulated that the amount of transfer to local government is at least 26 
percent of total central government budget. National average contribution of local government’s own source 
revenue (fiscal autonomy) to total local revenue is less than 15 percent, while the transfer fund (fiscal 
dependency) contributes more than 60 percent [3]. On the expenditure side, national average of local 
government expenditure reached 45 percent for personnel spending, followed by capital expenditure (25 
percent) and goods & service expenditure (20 percent).  
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After fifteen years of decentralization, although the results may vary across the regions, Indonesian GDP growth 
rate fluctuates around 4-6 percent per year as described in Figure 1. Theoretical study regarding the relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and economic growth have shown mixed results. The improvement of public 
sector efficiency and promote economic growth due to better knowledge of local government to respond to its 
local constituent [4]. On the contrary, [5] proposed opposite argument. Interestingly, previous empirical studies 
provide mixed results across countries. Positive relationship between decentralization and economic growth is 
found in 51 countries [6], in Russia [7]; Central Europe [8]; Vietnam [9]. Some studies argue that 
decentralization may hinder economic growth, such as in: 46 countries [10]; China [11,12]. Inconclusive result 
also found in several studies such as in 23 developing countries [13], OECD countries [14]; Indonesia [15]. 
 
Figure 1: Indonesia GDP Annual Growth Rate 
This study offers new perspective on the relationship between decentralization and economic growth by 
exploring two different measures of regional gross domestic product (RGDP) use in Indonesia national account, 
such as RGDP to capture contributions of oil and gas revenue and RGDP without oil. The purpose is to level the 
playing field of all local government without the influence of income from oil and gas sector. This paper 
employs two measurements of fiscal decentralization such as revenue decentralization and expenditure 
decentralization that captures both sides of local government budget. This study contributes to the literature on 
growth and fiscal decentralization in such that this paper examines the effect of fiscal decentralization using 
RGDP with oil and without oil to find out the effect of decentralization on both output measure which may 
affect some resource rich region significantly with different measurement of fiscal decentralization. This study 
makes the first attempt to explore the relationship between regional growth (with and without oil and gas sector) 
with revenue and expenditure fiscal decentralization measure in the region. 
This study employs provincial level data on economic growth due to the limited availability of lower tier 
government data such as regencies/municipality data. This study focuses its analysis on socio demography and 
economic aspect of regional growth, other factors such as political, institutions, culture and/or other aspects, is 
not covered in this paper. The period coverage of this paper started from the commencing of decentralization in 
2001 to the latest complete available data, that is 2014.  Further study is encouraged to provide comprehensive 
understanding to explain decentralization effect on regional growth for countries that may have similar 
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conditions with Indonesia.  
This study is organized as follows. Section 2 offers literature reviews that summarize previous studies regarding 
fiscal decentralization and other macroeconomic factors that may affect economic growth. Section 3 proceeds 
with brief explanation of Indonesian decentralization. Section 4 introduces empirical specifications. Section 5 
presents the analysis result, and section 6 present conclusion of the analysis and section 7 proposed several 
policy recommendations based on the analysis result. 
2. Literature Reviews 
There has been significant research on fiscal decentralization and economic growth. Theoretically, different 
researcher proposed different arguments regarding this matter. Author in [16] argues that the ability of local 
government to capture local needs improve the efficiency of local government to deliver public service compare 
to central government; decentralized provision of public goods improves social welfare to respond to different 
preferences under the assumptions that the government act solely to maximize welfare and uniform public goods 
are provided across regions [4]. Opposite perspective offers by [5] that argue government act as leviathan and 
operates as monopolist over local resources to its own benefit instead of maximizing its constituent welfare. 
More recent theoretical perspectives introduce political aspect and asymmetric information into account such as 
[17,18]. 
Mixed results also found in empirical studies. Positive relationship between decentralization and economic 
growth is found in China with different time period [19], [20], and [21]; United States for 1992-1996 [22]; 51 
countries [6], 21 regions in Russia for 1997 [7]; Central Europe for 1990-2004 [8]; 61 regions in Vietnam for 
1997-2007 [9]. On the other hand, some studies argue that decentralization may hinder economic growth, such 
as in: 46 countries for 1970-1989 [10]; China with different time period [11,12]. Other studies found 
inconclusive result such as in 23 developing countries for 1974-1991 [13]; OECD countries for 1974-1991 [14]; 
US and Italy [23]; and Indonesia [15]. 
Several macroeconomic factors that may affect regional economic growth has been listed by [24]which 
categorized in thirty-six categories [25]. Several factors may not be eligible to use in regional level due to 
several reasons because the data is not available in regional level and the data is invariant due to central 
government policy that uniformly applied across the regions such as exchange rates, trade policy, and 
government debt policy. Below is listed several macroeconomic factors used in this study which may affect 
regional economic growth such as: 
• Population 
Most research supported the assumptions that population discouraged economic growth because given limited 
available capital, productivity is decrease with additional people [26;27]. Other study argue that migration may 
increase popolation and it has positive relationship with growth [28].  
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• Heterogenous society 
Indonesia is home more than 600 ethnic groups which speak 700 languages. A study regarding the country’s 
ethnic and cultural diversity by [29] measured ethnic diversity across the countries using ethnic fractionalization 
index. Ethnic fractionalization index is an index to measure the probability of two randomly individuals in a 
region are from different ethnic group. The index ranges from 0 to 1, with larger index associated with more 
diverse society. The study found that Indonesia as a country has an index of 0.81. Previous studies argue that 
heterogenous society hinder economic growth through the vulnerability of society to conflict [30]; lack of trust 
among society members [31]; and through reducing in the investment rate, increasing public consumption [32]. 
This paper employs ethnic fractionalization index as used in [33]. 
• Employment 
This factor has been supported by significant researchers as one of the growth engine in an economy. Okun’s 
law examines the negative relationship between unemployment and economic growth. The increase in 
productivity is expected to rise output then make it possible for worker to earn more revenue and therefore 
generate higher GDP [34]. Several studies supported this argument such as authors study at regional government 
by [35,36] in their study in Brazil, and across countries study such as [37,38]. 
• Infrastructures  
Many studies have examined the significant impact of infrastructures on productivity and economic 
development. Infrastructures work through two channels, that are, supplementary input and increasing total 
factor productivity. It provides better access and better distribution of provisions of public goods to the society 
[39,40,41]. Infrastructure also provides positive spill-over effect that support other capital work more efficiently 
[25]. This paper employs literacy rate and life expectancy to proxy infrastructure.  
• Economic structure  
Share of economic sector in the economic structure is important to capture the effect of specific factor that 
contributes significantly in the regional economy. This variable introduced by [42] to be considered as one of 
growth determinants. After the financial crisis, Indonesian economy shifted from agriculture economy to more 
value added sector that is manufacturing sector.  
• Government spending  
Effective local government spending is expected to foster growth as argues by [43,44] through provision of 
infrastructures.  Although recent studies argue that there is a possibility of negative effect of government 
spending on growth. It may work through government spending on sectors which are unrelated to growth 
activity such as subsidy and transfer and welfare related infrastructure as described by [42,45]. 
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• Openness  
Trade shows the amount of goods and services trade by one province with other province and other countries. 
Openness argues as growth engine because integrated  economy provides more trade in goods and flow of ideas 
as argue by [46]. Postitive and significant impact of trade openness with economic growth is argued by [47]. 
Author [48] in his study in Indonesia argues that higher growth of Indonesia can be identified with its increasing 
trading partners.  
• Investments 
The accumulation of capital in the economy to boost one economy to grow or to sustain a certain level of 
growth rate as argued by several researchers such as [42,26,49]. Different result argue by other studies 
especially in regional level, such as insignificant results on Brazil for 1975-1990 by [34] and for  Vietnam for 
1995-2000 [50]. 
The expected sign of estimation variables in this study is describe in table 1 below. 
Table 1: Expected Sign of Estimated Coefficient 
 
3. Indonesian Decentralization 
The Indonesian government structure consists of provinces, then provinces divided by regencies and 
municipalities. Presently Indonesia consist of 34 provinces, 416 districts, and 98 municipalities. Kalimantan 
Utara is the youngest province established in 2014, which before as part of Kalimantan Timur. 
It is further elaborated in Law No.23/2014 regarding Local Government that has drawn a separation function 
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between central and local government including the funding to support it and how the local government running 
its business.  There are three main classification of government functions, as described in Figure.2.  
 
Figure 2: Indonesia Government Functions 
As stipulated in the Law number 17/2003 regarding National Finance, the central government is obligated to 
transfer the fund to local government to support its functions. The local government revenue comprises of own 
source revenue (generated from local tax and retributions and other locally generated revenue); 
intragovernmental transfer or balancing funds from central government, and others (such as grants). Balancing 
fund is the most significant revenue source for local government in Indonesia. The basic principles for balancing 
funds is “money follows functions” principle, which means that the funding is following the respected 
government function for each level of government.  The transfer also follows other principles such as 
proportional, fairness, transparent, and customized to local area capacity and circumstances. There are three (3) 
types of balancing funds, such as: 
• General allocation fund - Dana Alokasi Umum (DAU) 
DAU is a block grant and formula-based grand. Block grant refers to the utilization of the fund to the local 
government to perform its designated functions within the implementation of autonomy principles according to 
its own needs and preference. Formula-based grant meaning that there is a certain method to determine the 
amount of DAU transferred to local government. The fund is distributed monthly and become available before 
the designated month. DAU holds the largest share of the balancing fund. 
• Specific allocation fund – Dana Alokasi Khusus (DAK) 
DAK is an earmarked grant, it is defined as the fund originated from national budget allocated to specific local 
government to fund particular local government functions that correspond with national priority (it covers public 
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service, defense, economic, environment, housing and public facility, health, culture, religion, social security, 
and education). The central government (technical ministries, ministry of home affairs, and ministry of finance, 
and ministry of development planning) determines the eligible local government to receive DAK.  
• Revenue Sharing Fund (Dana Bagi Hasil – DBH) 
Law No.33/2004 defines DBH as the fund allocated from the state budget based on percentage share to finance 
local government needs in the application of decentralization principles. DBH consist of tax revenue share, 
excise revenue share, and natural resources revenue share. Resource rich region is given larger share of its own 
resource revenue, while the rest is distributed by central government.  
National average of the balancing fund’s contribution is 60 percent of local government’s revenue as described 
in table 2 below. Authors in [51,52,53] argues DAU has rewarded poor region generously to the extent that it 
now become a disincentive for the local regions to generates its own source revenue. Own source revenue of 
local government is on the average contributes only 15 percent. Government Regulation No.55 year 2005 
regarding Balancing Fund stipulated that minimum amount of DAU transferred to local government is 26% of 
the net domestic revenue in the annual state budget which annually increase simultaneously with central 
government budget.  
Table 2: Average Share of Local Government Revenue 2001 – 2014 
 
Table 2: (cont’d) 
 
 
On the expenditure side, personnel expenditure contributes the largest share (45 percent) followed by capital and 
Type of revenue (%) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Own Source 6.7 8 7.6 8.3 7.8 6.8 5.67
General allocation fund  (DAU) 70.3 67.9 62.8 62.1 55.8 60.8 51.31
Specific allocation fund (DAK) 1.1 0.8 3 3 3.1 5.7 5.85
Revenue Sharing Fund (DBH) - taxes 7.4 8.1 8.9 11.2 11 10.5 7.55
Revenue Sharing Fund (DBH)- natural resources 10.9 10.2 9.6 7.2 12.6 10.1 6.85
Others 3.6 5 8.1 8.2 9.7 6.1 6.93
Financing 0 0 0 0 0 0 15.84
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Type of revenue (%) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Own Source 6.15 6.41 6.59 7.84 8.91 9.57 11.44
General allocation fund  (DAU) 48.95 48.73 46.94 45.74 48.26 47.53 45.23
Specific allocation fund (DAK) 6.2 6.83 5.46 5.33 4.82 4.94 4.47
Revenue Sharing Fund (DBH) - taxes 7.28 7.05 7.6 5.66 5.41 4.51 3.56
Revenue Sharing Fund (DBH)- natural resources 8.41 6.88 8.96 8.92 8.86 7.11 7.02
Others 7.82 9.62 13.53 17.92 13.88 14.68 16.85
Financing 15.19 14.48 10.92 8.59 9.86 11.66 11.43
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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goods and service expenditures as described in table 3. This can be interpreted that nearly half of the local 
government expenditure allocated to personnel salary expense, which left only limited amount to provide public 
goods. 
Table 3: Share of local government expenditure 2001 – 2014 
 
Table 3: (cont’d) 
 
 
The significant local government spending for personnel expenditure limited the available resource to provide 
public goods and services such as provision of local infrastructures, social services, and subsidy. Study of  [54] 
describes that personnel spending is extremely high by any international standard and it takes away a significant 
portion of production of public service such as health, education, and infrastructure and spent on unproductive 
uses such as overstaffing, government offices, and expensive cars; Reference [55] argues that DAU encourages 
local government to increase its salary;  Reference [56] argues  that development expenditure encourages 
economic growth, while personnel expense he propose that  DAU creates incentives for districts proliferation; 
Reference [57] argue that development expenditure encourages economic growth, while personnel expense 
work on opposite direction. 
4. Empirical Specifications  
This study employs data from the implementation of decentralization from 2001 to 2014 in 33 provinces across 
Indonesia. Data in this study is obtained from several government agencies such as Central and Regional 
Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik - BPS), Indonesian Ministry of Finance (Directorate General of Taxes 
and Directorate General of Fiscal Balance), and technical ministries (Ministry of Health, Ministry of Public 
Works), and local governments.  
share of local government expenditure (%) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
goods & services 18.4 20.9 20.3 19.4 20.8 22.1 17.61
capital 17.9 19.7 22.4 18.3 20.7 27.1 30.84
grants&subsidy 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.45
social & regional allocation 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.64
salary 55.2 49.8 47.2 52.5 49.4 42 42.59
others 8.5 9.6 10.1 9.8 9.1 8.8 0.87
total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
share of local government expenditure (%) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
goods & services 17.36 17 16.58 16.16 15.64 16.73 17.93
capital 30.06 25.84 21.24 18.41 19.72 21.46 21.39
grants&subsidy 1.79 3.12 4.86 2.51 2.34 2.5 2.02
social & regional allocation 5.68 5.97 5.54 17.75 17.54 16.77 17.72
salary 44.19 47.42 51.08 44.98 44.48 42.38 40.81
others 0.92 0.65 0.7 0.19 0.28 0.16 0.13
total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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The model used in this study is specified in equation (1) below:  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝜆𝜆1𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑝𝑝 + 𝜆𝜆2 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝜆𝜆3 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝜆𝜆4 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆5 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆6 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆7 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝜆𝜆8 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝜆𝜆9 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝜆𝜆10 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆9𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   + 𝛾𝛾𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                                                                                    (1)  
where 𝑒𝑒 is the provinces in Indonesia, 𝑙𝑙 is the time subscripts; 𝑦𝑦 is the proxy of log of regional gross domestic 
products of province i in year t with oil (𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  and without oil (𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) ; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is log of 
population;𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is  ethnic fractionalization index;  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   is employment rate; 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   is the literacy 
level to measure human capital infrastructure which performed by local government; 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   is life 
expectancy to measure health infrastructure as a function performed by local government; 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   is the 
share of manufacturing sector in regional GDP; 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is log of total government spending; 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is log of total 
investment; 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is log of total trade;   𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the proxy of fiscal decentralization measures both in revenue (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  and expenditure measures(𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖);  𝜔𝜔 are panel effects; 𝜀𝜀 is the error term; 𝛾𝛾 and 𝛿𝛿 are the 
parameter. The statistical summary of the variables described in table 4 below. 
Table 4: Summary Statistics 
 
 
Measuring fiscal decentralization has been long discussed in both theoretical and empirical studies due to its 
extensive dimensions and different strides. There is no single indicator that able to capture the comprehensive 
pictures and that is the reason why each dimension should measure separately as proposed by [58] and [59]. 
Given this reason, two different fiscal decentralization measures are introduced in this paper, that are revenue 
decentralization and expenditure decentralization. Revenue decentralization define as the share of local 
government (municipal and province) of total government revenue (aggregation of municipal, province and 
central government), while expenditure decentralization measures the share of local government expenditure of 
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total government expenditure. Expenditure decentralization has been widely used to measure fiscal 
decentralization as it measures the degree of local government responsibility in providing public goods as argue 
by [60,61]. This measurement also important in Indonesia decentralization since intragovernmental transfer is 
decided by central government and most of the taxing right stays on central government authority, while local 
government only allowed to generate its own revenue based on Law number 28/2009 regarding Local Tax and 
Retribution.  
There are several alternatives that may employs in this paper. Ordinary least square (OLS) known as best linear 
unbiased estimation may not be working since most of growth regression suffer from omitted variable bias. 
Panel effect regression may use to handle this problem since it is able to overcome omitted variable bias by 
introducing individual effects. However, panel effect regression might not be able to handle another issue in 
growth regression such as endogeneity problem from growth determinants. General method of moment (GMM) 
by Arellano-Bond offers solution using further lag of dependent variable as instrumental variable to overcome 
endogeneity problem. This paper follows traditional approach using first and second lag of regional GDP and 
measure of decentralization as instrumental variables. The validity of decentralization measure as instrument 
variable due to the fact that the decentralization policy is consistent over time, the regional growth in future 
period should not affect decentralization policy.  
The validity of these instrument is justified by the result of both Sargan test and Hansen J-statistics test of over 
identifying restriction and residual autocorrelation test in this model. Sargan and Hansen J-statistics test assess 
the validity of restrictions of moment conditions. The null hypothesis of both Sargan test and Hansen J-statistics 
test is H0: overidentifying restrictions are valid. If the p-value of the Sargan test and Hansen J-statistics test is 
statistically significant, then we reject the null hypothesis that indicates there are problems with the instruments 
[62]. 
5. Results 
Table 1 present the detail of the analysis results, as follows. The result indicates that both revenue and 
expenditure decentralization measures discourage regional economic growth of total GDP (including oil and 
gas). As aforementioned in the section 2, fiscal decentralization have several characteristics that may hamper 
economic growth. Several studies have argued regarding this conclusion even for the same economy, the result 
may be different depend on how and when the analysis is performed. One possible explanation for this result is 
the function of intragovernmental transfer as a balancing fund from richer region to those with small resources 
failed to provide incentive for factor movement that generate growth convergence as argue by study in  [63] and 
[23] both authors proposed that economy with no significant intragovernmental transfer able to reach income 
convergence faster than economy with significant intragovernmental transfer. on the revenue side, local 
government with smaller resource (not rich in oil and gas revenue) may end up waiting for balancing fund 
through intragovernmental transfer channeled by central government instead of optimizing its own source 
revenue. Intragovernmental transfer has created disincentive for poor region to improve their ability to increase 
local own source revenue. This behavior makes poor region stay poor because they’re reluctant to be 
independent from central government who is always there to assist. In term of expenditure, the inefficient 
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spending of local government on personnel expenditure deteriorates the regional growth in this total output 
economy (creates moral hazard on spending the local government budget). Poor region tends to spend carelessly 
since they know that central government will provide the funding for them by taking some part of resource rich 
region revenue as balancing fund. Cautions must be applied for resource rich provinces since oil and gas is a 
non-renewable resource. The diminishing oil and gas reserve will deteriorate the fiscal capacity of these 
provinces and it also bring extra burden to central government to provide for sufficient intragovernmental fund. 
Table 5: Regional Growth Regression Result 
 
RGDP RGDP without oil RGDP RGDP without oil 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.026 -0.068
(0.121) (0144)
0.907 0.928
(0.111)*** (0.126)***
5.277 -0.105 6.091 -0.276
(2.142)** (0.629) (1.966)** (0.341)
3.421 -1.322 2.94 -0.48
(4.338) (2.371) (3.08) (0.994)
0.009 0.01 0.012 0.007
(0.005)* (0.005)* (0.004)** (0.003)*
-12.671 5.101
(12.42)** (2.868)*
-8.26 4.069
(3.905)** (1.65)**
0.082 -0.007 0.0915 -0.005
(0.021)*** (0.014) (0.019)*** (0.013)
-0.013 -0.034 -0.025 0.025
(0.058) (0.020)* (0.057) (0.019)
0.389 0.501 -0.024 1.165
(0.863) (0.481) (1.392) (0.917)
0.3 0.068 0.232 0.068
(0.126)** (0.055) (0.098)** (0.048)
-0.001 -0.018 -0.006 -0.028
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.023)
-0.263 -0.031 -0.242 0.007
(0.177) (0.044) (0.202) (0.064)
Number of observations 
Number of groups
Number of Instruments
Legend *p<0.1  **p<0.05  ***p<0.01
Sargan  test  Prob. 1.000 0.976 1.000 0.935
llrgdpcurr
lpop
efi1
employ
REVDEC1
EXPDEC1
lx
literacy
expectancy
mfgshare
lspdg
li
Hansen J-statistics  test  Prob.
2nd order  Prob.
0.977
0.461
Arellano Bond test for autocorrelation
378
33
23
llrgdpnonoil
0.486 0.916 0.478
0.486 0.205 0.373
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When measure without oil and gas, both revenue and expenditure decentralization foster regional economic 
growth. Leveling the economy by taking out revenue from oil and gas sector from the economy left all region 
with its own source revenue from local economic activity. For several resource rich provinces such as Aceh, 
Riau, Kalimantan Timur, Papua and Papua Barat, the size of these economy without oil and gas shrink up to 
only one-third of the original size that includes oil and gas sector. It shows how much these regions depend on 
oil and gas sector which make them vulnerable to the fluctuation of oil price and the continuously diminishing 
reserve. When all region is measure without oil and gas, the intragovernmental transfer seems able to support 
local government to perform its function efficiently. Measuring output without oil and gas, all local government 
own source revenue depends on its real economic activity on local tax and retribution which type and rate is 
uniformly predeterminant by the central government and intragovernmental transfer from central government. 
The analysis result support the study that argues decentralization is able to spur the regional economic growth. 
In other words, without considering oil and gas sector in its economy, local government seems able to use its 
revenue efficiently on growth activity that in the end able to increase economic output. This argument supported 
by the positive and significant sign of expenditure decentralization measure. Prudent and efficient local 
government spending seems enabling local government to support local government to perform its functions, to 
address its local needs and fostering local economic growth.  
Other growth determinant factor such as populations seems to foster regional economic growth except for model 
that measure regional GDP without oil using revenue decentralization. This may explain through the increasing 
of population through migration (not through fertility rate) as argue by [28]. Migration of population increasing 
expertise pool, experiences, ideas and perspective that benefits regional growth. Author [64] described that 
richer regions have access to advance in technology compare to poor region and it will increase the adoption of 
new technology that increase productivity faster.  
Employment rate presents positive and significant effects to regional growth in all estimations. Labor is one 
significant factor in economic growth model. The existence of labor complements capital and technology to 
create output in the economy. Employment that increase value added and productivity will decrease poverty rate 
and at the end foster economic growth [28]. 
The human capital infrastructure proxied with literacy presents positive and significant relationship with 
regional growth. Increasing skill of human capital as an input in the production process will increase 
productivity and output.  
Local government spending shows positive effects on regional growth in all cases. Spending on productive 
sector and growth-related activity such as infrastructure may create healthy business environment and increase 
productivity. to foster growth, local government should be able to spend its budget efficiently on growth related 
activity such as infrastructure and job creation. Wagner’s law states that public expenditure increases as per 
capita income is increasing. This is due to the financing of the expanding economy.  
Supporting diagnostic test is included in the bottom part of Table 5. Both Sargan test and Hansen J- statistics 
test basically examine whether the restriction on moment condition is rejected and not eligible for the 
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estimation. The probability of Sargan test and Hansen J- statistics test for all models shows there is no 
significant evidence to reject the null hypothesis. It shows that the all instruments are valid for the model. The 
result of Arellano Bond test for autocorrelation shows no autocorrelation issues on the estimation.  
6. Conclusions  
Despite growing literature on fiscal decentralization and regional economic growth, this study offers new 
perspective on the relationship between decentralization and economic growth by exploring two different 
measures of regional gross domestic product (RGDP) in Indonesia that is total RGDP and RGDP without oil to 
level the playing field to all local government on order to measure the local economy potential without the 
influence of oil and gas sector. This study also employs two measurement of fiscal decentralization such as 
revenue decentralization and expenditure decentralization that captures both sides of local government budget 
for both economic output measure. Several macroeconomic variables such as the employment rate, 
infrastructure measures, economic structure, the size of local government spending, the size of trade, and 
investment; socio-demographic variables such as population and the measure of diversity in the local economy 
also employed in this study. 
Using 33 provincial level data within the period 2000-2014, this study finds out that fiscal decentralization 
works in opposite way toward regional growth when it measures with total output.  The existence of 
intragovernmental transfer within total output economy seems to discourage regional growth both in revenue 
and expenditure decentralization measure. This may due to the inability of intragovernmental transfer to trigger 
productivity factor movement that initiate regional growth. Intragovernmental transfer is distributed by central 
government by moving a portion of revenue from resource rich region to poor region. On the revenue side, this 
create an incentive for poor region to remain poor and be eligible for intragovernmental transfer. On the 
expenditure side, intragovernmental transfer may create moral hazard on poor local government in the form of 
inefficient spending. Opposite result is obtained when the study level the playing field for all local government. 
Both revenue and expenditure seem able to encourage growth.  On the revenue side, local government revenue 
seems able to address the growth activity. On the expenditure side, the local government spending seems to 
properly address its local needs and initiate regional growth. Cautions must be applied for resource rich region 
not to rely heavily on oil and gas sector which is vulnerable sector and has sustainability issue.  
All other growth determinants variables work as expected except for population which present positive 
relationship with total output economy. The positive sign of population may work through the effect of 
migration that increase talent pool and ideas, therefore improving output. 
7. Policy Implications 
Based on the analysis result, there are several policy implications provided for both local and central 
government, such as: 
• Introducing reward and punishment mechanism for local government budget  
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This measure works on both revenue and expenditure sides of local government. On revenue side, measure such 
as minimum share/level local own source revenue must be introduced. This will encourage local government to 
increase its local fiscal capacity and decrease its dependency to intragovernmental transfer. Since local economy 
potential is different, several factors must be taken into consideration to set the minimum level. Reward such as 
extra grants (in form of project such as road, school, public transportation, and et cetera instead of fresh money) 
should be introduced to persuade healthy competition among local government. The same case may work for 
expenditure side of local budget. For example, if a local government able to procure certain level/rate of 
effective spending on social welfare and/or growth-related sector, reward is guaranteed. If the opposite is true, 
punishment in the form of refund of intragovernmental fund refund or intragovernmental fund cut may applied.  
• Relaxing tax and retribution base of local government 
To decrease local dependency to central government, more revenue authority should be granted to local 
government. Present situation is central government limit local government own source revenue in the form of 
local tax and retribution. Relaxing revenue base of local government may improve the amount of own source 
revenue of local government and decreasing the dependency to intragovernmental transfer fund. Relaxing local 
tax base must also be accompanied with prudent local budget supervision administration and sound law 
enforcement mechanism. 
• Introducing compulsory investment/saving for resource rich region 
Natural resource dependent economy always faces sustainability issue due to the vulnerable and non-renewable 
nature of this sector. Minimum compulsory investment/saving for resource rich region should be introduced as 
safety net or insurance to minimize loss of significant revenue after diminishing reserve or price fluctuation of 
the natural resource. The booming economy because of natural resource often become the worst victim after its 
natural resource glory days are over. It left the economy with no reserve, no saving or investment, high 
unemployment, low output and higher criminal rate. This compulsory investment/saving mechanism must be 
carefully regulated such as investment on lower risk instrument to protect the investment and prudently 
supervised by independent party. 
8. Study Limitations 
This study is limited on: 
• Provincial level data due to unavailability of lower tier government data. 
• Short coverage period due to limited availability of pre-decentralization period data 
• Focuses on socio demographic and macroeconomic factors due to the difficulty to find proxy for other 
aspect such as politics (due to uniform political system in the regional government in Indonesia).  
Based on these limitations, further study is encouraged to achieved comprehensive understanding on regional 
economic growth after the implementation of fiscal decentralization.  
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